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The probability of identification: applying ideas from forensic 
statistics to disclosure risk assessment 
 
C. J. Skinner 
University of Southampton, U. K. 
 
Summary.  This paper establishes a correspondence between statistical disclosure 
control and forensic statistics regarding their common use of the concept of ‘probability 
of identification’. The paper then seeks to investigate what lessons for disclosure control 
can be learnt from the forensic identification literature. The main lesson considered here 
is that disclosure risk assessment cannot, in general, ignore the search method employed 
by an intruder seeking to achieve disclosure. The effects of using several search methods 
are considered. Through consideration of the plausibility of assumptions and ‘worst case’ 
approaches, the papers suggests how the impact of search method can be handled. The 
paper focuses on foundations of disclosure risk assessment, providing some justification 
for some modelling assumptions underlying some existing record level measures of 
disclosure risk. The paper illustrates the effects of using different search methods in a 
numerical example based upon microdata from a sample from the 2001 Census. 
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1.  Introduction 
Statistical agencies conducting surveys or censuses need to protect the confidentiality of 
respondents when releasing outputs (Doyle et al, 2001). A major aim in confidentiality 
protection is to avoid identification. For example, the key ‘confidentiality guarantee’  in 
the National Statistics Code of Practice (National Statistics, 2004, p.7) is that ‘no 
statistics will be produced that are likely to identify an individual’ . Bethlehem et al. 
(1990) refer to similar principles elsewhere, such as in the International Statistical 
Institute Declaration on Professional Ethics. Concern about identification is particularly 
pronounced for releases of microdata, where the identification of a record in a microdata 
file might lead to the disclosure of the values of sensitive variables (Paass, 1988; Duncan 
and Lambert, 1989; Reiter, 2005). 
Principles of confidentiality protection, such as that embodied in the National 
Statistics Code of Practice, are often expressed broadly and require refinement if they are 
to be implemented in practice. The concept of identification itself seems fairly clear: it 
involves linking an element of the output, such as a microdata record, with a known 
individual or other specified unit (Bethlehem et al., 1990). More challenging is the 
concept of the probability of identification, to which confidentiality protection principles 
often refer. For example, the phrase ‘likely to’  in the National Statistics confidentiality 
guarantee is a probabilistic notion. The probability of identification is often referred to as 
identification risk or the risk of identity disclosure in the statistical disclosure control 
(SDC hereafter) literature (e.g. Paass, 1988; Duncan and Lambert, 1989; Reiter, 2005). 
The assessment of this probability is not straightforward, in particular since the 
underlying uncertainty might arise from a variety of sources, such as: whether an attempt 
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at identification by an intruder might take place, what auxiliary information an intruder 
might be able to use to attempt identification or which elements of the output or known 
individuals might be selected for an attempt at identification. Some of these sources of 
uncertainty may be handled by appropriate definition and alternative assumptions, such 
as via the components of risk approach of Marsh et al. (1991). Nevertheless, there remain 
challenges in assessing the uncertainty, as will become apparent in this paper.  
One field of statistical application where there has been rigorous discussion and 
development of methods for assessing the probability of identification is forensic science 
(e.g. Dawid, 1994; Balding and Donnelly, 1995). The aim of this paper is, first, to 
establish a correspondence between the forensic identification literature and that on SDC 
and then to consider the relevance of some ideas from the former literature to the 
assessment of identification risk in an SDC context.  
One particular implication of the forensic identification literature, upon which we 
shall focus, is that the probability of identification may depend upon the search method 
used by an intruder to select an element of the output and a known individual in the 
population for linking. While the SDC literature has acknowledged that intruders might 
employ different search methods to improve their chances of disclosure (e.g. Duncan and 
Lambert, 1989; Lambert, 1993), expressions for identification risk appearing in the SDC 
literature (e.g. Paass, 1988) are generally not dependent on the search method, for given 
auxiliary information. Following the forensic identification literature, we shall show how 
such dependence can arise. This finding makes the task of disclosure risk assessment 
harder, since the search method employed by a hypothetical intruder is necessarily 
unknown. We shall discuss how this problem might be addressed. 
 4 
We shall argue that the assessment of identification risk in SDC may be viewed as a 
generalization of a forensic identification problem. As a consequence, we shall consider 
how forensic identification approaches may be extended to identification risk assessment 
in SDC. Our focus will be on the foundations of risk assessment methodology. We shall, 
however, outline an application in section 6 and provide some numerical illustrations 
using data from the 2001 Census.  
Our focus in an SDC context will be on microdata, although much of this paper will 
also be relevant to any form of output where identification is relevant, i.e. where there is 
concern about the linking of elements of the output to known individuals (or other 
specified units). Our discussion will apply to cases where SDC methods, such as 
perturbation (Willenborg and de Waal, 2001), have been applied, provided that each 
record of the resulting microdata (or element of the output) can still be interpreted as 
having originated from a given individual. Otherwise, it is not clear that there is reason to 
be concerned about identification.     
We are not the first to observe the connection between forensic science and SDC. 
The reference to ‘fingerprinting’  in Willenborg and de Waal (2001) provides a simple 
example. A deeper but more indirect connection may be traced via discussions of 
connections between forensic science and record linkage, e.g. Copas and Hilton (1990), 
and connections between record linkage and SDC, e.g. Paass (1988).   
We shall begin in Section 2 by introducing a basic mapping between the two 
problems of forensic identification and disclosure risk assessment. A formal framework 
will then be set out in Section 3 to encompass both problems, and it will be indicated how 
the latter may be treated as a generalization of the former. In Section 4, we restrict 
 5 
attention to situations where an intruder seeks to achieve identification by a matching 
approach. The nature of identification risk for this approach and, in particular, the impact 
of different kinds of search methods are discussed in Section 5, with an illustration in 
Section 6. Finally, in Section 7 we discuss the broad conclusions and their SDC context. 
 
2. The basic correspondence between forensic identification and SDC 
To introduce the correspondence, we first set out the two problems in prototypical form.  
In forensic identification (e.g. Balding and Donnelly, 1995), a crime has been 
committed by an unknown culprit, who belongs to a specified population. The 
prosecuting authority identifies a member of this population as a suspect and brings the 
suspect to court. Identification occurs if the suspect and the culprit are identical, i.e. the 
suspect committed the crime or, in other words, the suspect is guilty. Data relevant to 
identification consist of values of variables observed both on the suspect and at the scene 
of the crime, e.g. from fingerprints, DNA profiles or eye witness testimony. 
In identification risk assessment for microdata (e.g. Paass, 1988), a microdata file is 
to be released, based upon data provided by a sample of responding units from a 
population in a survey or census. The file consists of records for these sample units, each 
with the values of several variables. An intruder, i.e third party, has information about 
one or more known units in the population and seeks to link one of these with one of the 
records. Identification occurs if the selected known unit is identical to the responding unit 
which provided data for the record. Data relevant to identification consist of values of 
variables which are both recorded in the microdata and available to the intruder for the 
known units. These are often called key variables.  
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The correspondence between the two problems is summarised in Table 1. The 
crime corresponds to cooperation by a responding unit in a survey or other form of data 
collection, normally undertaken under some pledge of confidentiality. (Given most 
agencies’  desire to avoid non-response, the correspondence is ironic!) The culprit 
corresponds to the responding unit. For simplicity, we shall generally suppose that both 
the culprit and the respondent are individuals. They each belong to some specified 
population.  The prosecuting authority corresponds to the intruder. The suspect, identified 
by the prosecuting authority, corresponds to the individual chosen by the intruder for 
linking to a given record in the microdata.  To assess the probability that the suspect is 
guilty, the court will use evidence which links the suspect to the scene of the crime via 
some shared characteristics, which correspond to the key variables. Some of the other 
forms of correspondence in Table 1 will be returned to in Section 3.  
In the forensic identification problem there is just one crime, one culprit and one 
suspect. (Note that if the crime is committed by several individuals jointly then we use 
the term culprit to denote this cluster of individuals. Likewise, the suspect may consist of 
a cluster of individuals who are suspected to have committed the crime jointly.) The 
forensic identification problem therefore corresponds to a special case of the disclosure 
risk assessment problem, where there is just a single record in the microdata and where 
the intruder links just one known individual to this record. We thus view the SDC 
problem as generalizing the forensic identification problem to the case where multiple 




3. Formalisation of the correspondence 
We now seek to expand upon and formalise the correspondence introduced in the 
previous section. We begin in Section 3.1. by setting out our general framework for 
assessing identification risk in the context of SDC. Then, in Section 3.2., we discuss how 
the forensic identification problem may be considered in this framework. 
3.1. SDC problem 
We consider a rectangular microdata file in which each record contains values on a 
common set of variables for a unit in a finite population U of size N. The units might in 
principle take different forms, for example households or businesses, but here we shall 
assume that they are individuals for simplicity. The microdata file might have been 
subject to perturbation by SDC methods, provided that it remains meaningful to associate 
each record with a unique individual. 
We follow Paass (1988) and assume, hypothetically, that an intruder seeks to link 
one or more microdata records to one or more known individuals in the population using 
the values of certain key variables observed in both the microdata and on the known 
individuals. The known individuals might be drawn from a different source available to 
third parties, for example a database consisting of multiple records containing values of 
the key variables.  
We define identification risk as the probability that a link between a particular 
record and a particular known individual is correct, conditional on an intruder having 
selected this record and this individual for linkage using a specified search method and 
specified auxiliary information. If the intruder attempts multiple links between several 
records and several known individuals then there is an identification risk for each 
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attempted link. Our definition implies a risk for each (record, known individual) pair 
which might have resulted from an intruder attack and, in particular, for the case when 
the known individual is in fact the individual to which the record belongs. We shall take 
the latter case to define the identification risk for a given record. The possible 
combination of such record level measures of risk to form a file level measure will be 
discussed in Section 7. 
Suppose then that the intruder arrives at a potential link between a microdata record 
r and a known individual in the population, denoted B, as a result of using a particular 
search method. The intruder might, for example, begin with a given target individual, B, 
in the population for which additional information is sought, and then search for the 
record in the microdata which appears to provide the best match to B. Let A(r) denote the 
individual to which microdata record, r, belongs and write A(r) as A when this is 
unambiguous. Identification occurs if A=B. Note that, in our notation, A and B represent 
unique identifiers of units in the population, e.g. names and addresses, whereas r belongs 
to the set s of microdata records which are labelled arbitrarily, {1,..., }s n= . The values of 
the key variables for r and B are denoted by ( )A rX  and BX  respectively, where ~ is used 
to signify that the key variables may be recorded in different ways in the two sources, for 
example because of measurement error, different definitions or because some SDC 
method has been applied to the microdata.   
The identification risk, may then be expressed as: 
identification risk Pr( ( ) | , ,microdata populationA r B X X= =  search method),                  (1) 
where microdataX  and populationX  consist of the values assumed available to the intruder 
on X for records in the microdata and on X for individuals in the population, respectively. 
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We suppose that the probability in (1) refers to two possible kinds of stochastic 
mechanism: first, a superpopulation model for  the generation of the values X  and X , 
which may include a stochastic SDC mechanism used to perturb X  or measurement 
error mechanisms affecting both X  and X ; and second, the selection of r and B , i.e. the 
combination of the search method and any probability sampling scheme (and 
nonresponse mechanism) which led to the selection of the respondents, underlying the 
microdata, from the population. 
We may compare the identification risk in (1) with the probability 
Pr( ( ) | , )microdata populationA r B X X=  , representing the uncertainty faced by  the intruder when 
assessing whether an arbitrary record r belongs to an arbitrary known individual B, prior 
to any search, assuming the same information on X  and X  is available. Such 
probabilities are considered by Paass (1988) and Reiter (2005). If this probability and the 
probability in (1) are the same then the search method is said to be ignorable. If this 
condition holds then disclosure risk assessment should be easier, since the search method 
of a hypothetical intruder is necessarily unknown. However, we shall show in section 5.2. 
that search methods need not necessarily be ignorable and we shall discuss in section 5.4. 
how we might deal with this possibility.  
The probability in (1) is to be interpreted from the perspective of the releasing 
agency or disclosure auditor, based upon a set of stated assumptions about what auxiliary 
information might be available and the various stochastic mechanisms above. These 
assumptions are taken to be ones that could be publicly defended as realistic or 
correspond to confidentiality protection guidelines. 
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3.2. Forensic Identification 
We now outline the corresponding set-up in forensic identification, following the analogy 
set out in Section 2. The microdata sample is reduced to a single record r corresponding 
to the culprit ( )A r committing the crime and B becomes the suspect, observed to have a 
particular combination of traits, i.e. key variables, known to be shared by the criminal. 
For simplicity, we conceive of the criminal and the suspect as individuals, although these 
might be groups of individuals working together. The population consists of the set of 
individuals who could have committed the crime and the search method refers to the 
selection of B from this population. There is only one culprit and hence the search 
method does not refer to the selection of A.  In the SDC set-up, ( )A r might therefore be 
interpreted as having committed the ‘crime’  of acting as a respondent in a survey, 
providing data upon which the given microdata record has been based.   
The evidence recovered from the crime scene about the culprit is denoted AX . The 
corresponding characteristics of the suspect are denoted BX . Again the key variables may 
be recorded in different ways, for example if AX  includes variables obtained from eye-
witness accounts then these may be subject to measurement error. The identification risk 
corresponds to the probability that the suspect is guilty, that is that B is the same person 
as A.  
Explicit expressions for this probability of guilt may be obtained under 
distributional assumptions. For example, for the case where AX  and BX  are normally 
distributed,   Lindley (1977) provides expressions for the likelihood ratio (for A B=  vs. 
A B≠ ) corresponding to this ‘posterior’  probability of guilt given the observed values 
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of AX  and BX . Fuller (1993) provides expressions which may be interpreted as 
extensions of Lindley’ s results to the SDC case. Expressions for a further special case 
will be considered in the next section. 
 
4. Linkage by matching 
The discussion in Sections 2 and 3 applies to a very wide class of possible search 
methods. In practice, an important class of methods, relevant to both SDC and forensic 
identification, may be defined in terms of matching. In this case, there is a decision rule 
with a binary outcome, match or non-match, for any pair ( , )A BX X . Thus, for a given 
record, r, in the microdata with key variable values ( )A rX  (or analogously a given crime 
with evidence ( )A rX  about the culprit), the decision rule defines a set rS  of possible 
individuals in the population with values of BX  which match ( )A rX  (and all remaining 
individuals will not match).  
Some examples of how such a matching rule might arise are: 
(i) if the key variables are categorical, misclassification is ignored and AX  
is said to match BX  if all of the key variables take the same value; 
(ii) if the key variables are continuous or categorical and AX  is said to 
match BX  if measurement error is judged to make AX  and BX  
‘indistinguishable’  (Balding and Donnelly, 1995, p.36);  
(iii) if the key variables are continuous or categorical and a record linkage 
decision rule of the Fellegi and Sunter (1969) type is used, generating 
three possible outcomes: ‘link’ , ‘non-link’  or a ‘possible link’  for each 
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pair ( AX , BX ). We suppose the ‘possible link’  category is pooled with 
one of the other two categories. 
Such matching approaches have been widely considered in the forensic identification 
literature. For example, Kingston (1965) defines identification in terms of the same kind 
of set 
r
S  as above. We shall return to example (i) in Section 6. 
 
5. Identification Risk for Linkage by Matching  
In this section we consider the nature of the probability of identification in (1) for the 
kinds of linkage methods described in Section 4. Sections 5.1. and 5.2. will focus on the 
case of a single record, as in forensic identification. The more general case will be 
considered in Sections 5.3 and 5.4.  
5.1. Basic Formulation for a Single Record 
We begin by considering an arbitrary record r in the microdata, ignoring the remaining 
microdata records, as in the forensic identification case. We define 
r
S as in Section 4 and 
let 
r
F  denote the size of this set. We assume that any discrepancies of measurement 
between X and X are allowed for in the matching rule sufficiently so that ( )A rX  matches 
( )A rX , i.e.  ( ) rA r S∈ , and thus 1rF ≥ . 
Suppose that, using the linkage approach, an intruder finds an individual B in 
r
S . 
We initially assume that 
r
F  is known. By assumption about the linkage rule and the fact 
that the remaining records are being ignored, the key variable values ( ) ,A r BX X  carry no 
information about identification, i.e. whether ( )A r B= , beyond the following 
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information: ( ) ,
r r
A r S B S∈ ∈ and 
r
F . Thus, the identification risk in (1) may be 
expressed as: 
  identification risk = Pr( ( ) | , ,microdata populationA r B X X=  search method) 
     Pr( ( ) | ( ) , ,
r r r
A r B A r S B S F= = ∈ ∈ , search method).             (2)  
Under fairly weak conditions on the mechanism leading to the selection of r and B, the 
expression in (2) reduces to  
   identification risk 1/
r
F=  .              (3)                          
For example, (3) holds if the intruder is equally likely to select B as any member of 
r
S , 
conditional on r and the event 
r
B S∈ . Assumptions for (3) to hold are also made and 
justified by Dawid (1994, assumption A1) and Balding and Donnelly (1995, Assumption 
1 and equation 7) in the forensic identification context. One circumstance where (3) 
might be questionable in an SDC context is where the intruder begins with an arbitrary 
target individual in the population, unequal probability sampling is employed in the 
selection of the microdata sample and a match is observed which is unique in the 
microdata. In this case, the 
r
F  possible samples that could lead to this observed outcome 
are not necessarily equally likely if the probability function in (2) is defined in terms of 
the sampling scheme. Hence (3) may not hold. Nevertheless, in this case it appears 
difficult to arrive at an alternative to 1/
r
F  for the right hand side of (3), which is a 
function of information which an intruder might realistically have in practice, and we 
shall not pursue such concerns here. For the remainder of the paper we shall suppose that 
expression (2) does reduce to expression (3). 
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The simple expression 1/
r
F  in (3) has been noted by several authors, both in the 
forensic identification literature, e.g. Kingston (1965), and in the SDC literature, e.g. 
Duncan and Lambert (1989). The difficulty with (3) in practice is that 
r
F  will generally 
be unknown. Indeed, in the SDC context a key consideration is to ensure that the form of 
release should not permit key variables to be available where
r
F  might be known to a 
potential intruder and be small, say one or two. When 
r
F  is unknown, we remove it from 
the conditioning set in (2) to give: 
identification risk Pr( ( ) | ( ) ,
r r
A r B A r S B S= = ∈ ∈ , search method)  
   
1




A r B A r S B S F F
=
= = ∈ ∈ =∑  search method)   
Pr( | ( ) , ,
r r r
F F A r S B S× = ∈ ∈  search method)            







= ∑ Pr( | ( ) , ,r r rF F A r S B S= ∈ ∈  search method) ,  
under our assumption that (2) reduces to (3), and hence 
        identification risk   (1/ | ( ) , ,
r r r
E F A r S B S= ∈ ∈  search method),       (4) 
where the expectation is with respect to the conditional distribution 
Pr( | ( ) , ,
r r r
F A r S B S∈ ∈ search method) of 
r
F  given the observed events. The problem of 
determining the identification risk then reduces to one of determining this distribution. 
We now consider how to obtain an expression for this distribution, following the 
approach used in the forensic identification literature. This involves specifying both a 
superpopulation model, governing the probability process underlying the event 
r
B S∈ , 
and a search method. Treating the record r as fixed, we may specify the superpopulation 
model by specifying the distribution of the binary indicator variables 
riZ  for whether iX  
matches ( )A rX (for individuals i in the population). The event rB S∈  then corresponds to 
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the event 1
rBZ =  and the assumption that ( )A rX  matches ( )A rX  corresponds to the event 
that 1
rAZ = . A standard superpopulation model (e.g. Kingston,1965; Dawid, 1994) which 
treats the size, N, of the population as fixed, is that the ,
riZ i U∈ , are independent and 
identically distributed Bernoulli trials with p denoting the probability of a match.  This 
implies that 
r
F  is Binomially distributed with parameters N and p and we refer to this as 
the Binomial model. The relation between these models and some models used in SDC 
will be considered in Section 6. We shall treat p as known, for simplicity, in the 
remainder of this section. In forensic identification applications, p will often be estimated 
from a population database, possibly one from which a suspect has been selected. In SDC 
applications, p might similarly be estimated from a database available to an intruder, but 
also from multiple records in the microdata, as will be discussed in Section 6. The latter 
option has no analogue in forensic identification.  
In the following section, we set out a number of possible search methods 
considered in the forensic identification literature and discuss the nature of the 
conditional distribution for 
r
F  and the expression for the risk in (4) given these search 
methods and the Binomial model. 
5.2 Search Methods from forensic identification literature 
In this section, we describe a series of search methods, labelled r1, r2,… to signify that 
the search begins with a specified record.  
Search Method r1: suspect is selected by searching the population randomly until a 
                    match is found. 
This method may be illustrated in the SDC context by the ‘journalist scenario’  of Paass 
(1988), where a journalist selects a record from the microdata with an unusual 
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combination of values of the key variables and tries to find an known matching individual 
in the population by searching through sources accessible to the journalist until a match is 
found. The implicit assumption here is that the ‘systematic’  element of the journalist’ s 
method of searching the population is fully captured by the matching rule and that, 
otherwise, the search is equally likely to lead to any one of the 
r
F members of 
r
S . 
Under this search method, we may write Pr( | ( ) ,
r r r
F A r S B S∈ ∈ , search method) 
= Pr( | ( )
r r
F A r S∈ , search method) since, conditional on ( )
r
A r S∈ , the event 
r
B S∈  is 
not informative about 
r
F  because some match must be found if we search long enough. 
The event ( )
r
A r S∈ tells us that 1
rAZ =  but, under the Binomial model, is not informative 
about 
riZ  for i A≠  and so the conditional distribution of rF  is obtained by writing 
1 ( 1)
r r
F F= + −  and noting that the conditional distribution of 1
r
F −  given ( )
r
A r S∈  
under this search method is Binomial with parameters 1N −  and p (Lenth, 1986; Dawid, 
1994, p.167). Straightforward calculation using the Binomial density shows that the 
expectation in (4) has the closed form expression: 
    identification risk [1 (1 ) ] /[ ]Np Np= − − .           (5) 
An implicit assumption here is that N and p are known. A further assumption is that y, the 
number of non-matches arising before the intruder finds a match, is unrecorded and hence 
not conditioned upon. The effect of recording y will be considered in method r3. 
Search Method r2: suspect is drawn at random from the population and found to match. 
This method appears less plausible in the SDC context, since the expected payoff to a 
potential intruder seems likely to be too low if no search is undertaken. The nearest 
parallel appears to be the case of ‘spontaneous recognition’  (Willenborg and de Waal, 
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2001, p.62) where an intruder happens, by chance, to observe a match between a 
microdata record and a known individual.  
For this search method, the event 
r
B S∈  is informative about 
r
F , making larger 
values of 
r
F more likely. We may write: 
Pr( | ( ) , ) Pr( | ( ) ) Pr( | , ( ) )
r r r r r r r r
F A r S B S F A r S B S F A r S∈ ∈ ∝ ∈ ∈ ∈ , (6) 
where implicitly each term also conditions on the search method. The first term on the 
right hand side of (6) is the density function of 1 ( 1, )
r
F Bin N p+ − , as for method r1. 
The second term equals /
r
F N  since we assume the suspect is drawn randomly. We may 
interpret the implied distribution Pr( | ( ) , )
r r r
F A r S B S∈ ∈  as a ‘size-biased’  Binomial 
distribution (Dawid, 1994; Balding and Donnelly, 1995). It is straightforward to show 
that the constant of proportionality in (6) is  /[1 ( 1) ]N N p+ −  and hence that the 
conditional expectation in (4) takes the form: 
identification risk 1/{1 ( 1) }N p= + − .            (7) 
Search Method r3: as search method r1 but where the length of the search is recorded. 
If y is recorded then the event 
r
B S∈  does become informative about 
r
F , as for method 
r2.  Indeed, if 0y = , methods r2 and r3 are identical. To obtain the conditional 
distribution of 
r
F  of interest, all components of expression (6) may be modified by 
including the event of y previous non-matches alongside the conditioning event 
( )
r
A r S∈ . This simply has the effect of replacing  N  by N y−  in each of the terms on 
the right hand side of (6) and hence (c.f. Dawid,1994; Balding and Donnelly, 1995)  
expression (7) is modified to:  
  identification risk = 1/{1 ( 1 ) }N y p+ − − .          (8) 
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Search Method r4: suspect is found to be unique match in a database. 
If a search is made among y+1 potential suspects in a database, the same probability 
calculations may be made as for method r3 with y known (Balding and Donnelly, 1995) 
and so the identification risk is the same for these two methods. In the SDC context, this 
method corresponds again to the journalist scenario where the database represents a 
particular source available to the journalist. 
These results for methods r3 and r4 have been subject to some debate in the 
forensic identification literature. Expression (8) implies that the greater the value of y, i.e. 
the longer the search, the greater the risk of identification, although this increase will tend 
to be minor if the fraction of the population searched, /y N , is small. This contrasts with 
an alternative argument, advanced for example by Stockmarr (1999), that the risk may be 
severely reduced by such a database search. See Dawid (2001) and Balding (2002) for 
some of the ensuing debate. To illustrate this debate in an SDC context, suppose that a 
journalist claims to have found a unique match between a named individual and a record 
in a public use microdata file released by a statistical agency. On discussion, the 
journalist admits to have found the match by searching through a large database of 
100,000 individuals. The agency might claim, following the alternative argument,  that it 
is not surprising that a match has been found as a result of such an extensive search and 
argues that, as a result, little weight should be given to the observed match, i.e. the 
probability that the match is correct should be treated as small. This paper’ s position, 
following e.g. Balding (2002), is to suggest that such an argument would be misleading. 
It is true that the probability of finding a match does increase the longer the search and 
thus that the journalist’ s discovery may be unremarkable overall. Nevertheless, for the 
 19 
particular record for which a match is found, the fact that a further proportion of the 
population has been searched for a match without success increases rather than decreases 
the probability that the match is correct. The issue is then whether the value of this 
increased probability for this record (i.e. expression (8) under the Binomial model, 
assuming p is known) is of concern. 
Search Method r5: method r1 is extended by continued searching. 
If the search is continued without a further match being found then this method may be 
treated as equivalent to either methods r3 or r4, with y equal to the number of non-
matches. If the continued search leads to another individual being found which matches, 
then Dawid (1994) provides an expression for the resulting risk, assuming y is not 
recorded. In the extreme, if a complete search of the population revealed 
r
F , the number 
of individuals in the population matching A, the risk would again become 1/
r
F , as in (3). 
5.3. Generalization: Search Methods for SDC 
Attention was restricted to the case of a single record in the previous two sections. In the 
general SDC setting, however, there will be multiple records in the microdata. Possible 
extensions of the previous search methods to this case will be considered in this section 
and are summarised in Table 2.  These extensions are of two types, termed fishing and 
directed searches by Paass (1988).  
In a fishing method, the intruder first selects a record (or records) in the microdata, 
possibly a record that he/she expects to be easier to identify as a result of having unusual 
values or combinations of values of key variables. For example, Paass (1988) considers 
an expenditure survey, where an intruder might select an individual purchasing two or 
more boats. The intruder then seeks to find a match for this record using one of the 
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methods r1, r2... above. The judgement about the record being unusual might be based 
upon the microdata, in the extreme if the record is unique in the sample with respect 
to X (i.e. does not match any other record). We let r1u, r2u… denote the use of search 
methods r1, r2… for a record which is unique in this sense. We treat the case where the 
intruder selects multiple records for linkage as repetition of methods r1, r1u etc.  
In what Paass (1988) refers to as a directed search, the intruder begins with a 
known target individual (or individuals) in the population and then searches for a match 
in the microdata. Out of six scenarios considered by Paass (1988), only one (the journalist 
scenario above) involves fishing. The remaining five are directed searches. In three of 
these, it is assumed that the intruder begins with a particular individual in the population 
and then searches the microdata file for a match. In the remaining two scenarios the 
intruder begins with a set of known individuals in the population and then seeks matches 
for each of these in the microdata file. Duncan and Lambert (1989), Lambert (1993) and 
Reiter (2005) also focus on the case of a directed search.  
By interchanging the role of the known population individuals and the microdata 
records, the search methods in Section 5.2 may be transposed to the case of a directed 
search. We assume that any intruder who has managed to gain access to the microdata 
would search the whole file and would not stop at an intermediate stage, for example, at 
the first match to the target individual, B. We thus reject the counterparts of methods r1, 
r2 and r3 as unrealistic, since they involve either stopping (r1 and r3) or no search at all 
(r2). The counterpart of method r4, treating the microdata file as the counterpart of the 
database, is:  
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Search method B1: for a given target individual B, a unique matching microdata record 
is found. 
The use of B in the notation B1 is intended to signify that the search begins with a 
specified known individual B. The intruder cannot search for matches among individuals 
falling outside the microdata sample and thus the counterpart of method r5 is rejected as 
impossible. We also reject methods which generate more than one match in a search of 
the microdata, on the grounds of restricting attention to worst cases. It would be possible 
to qualify method B1 by some method for selecting the target individual. For example, a 
method which selected the individual as unique within a database might be denoted B1u. 
It would also be possible for the intruder to select more than one known individual for 
linkage, for example the set of individuals within a database, resulting in an effective 
repetition of method B1. We shall, however, only explore such extensions implicitly 
through consideration of B1. 
5.4. Generalization: Risk assessment for SDC 
In this section, we consider the generalization of the results on identification risk in 
Sections 5.1 and 5.2. to the case of SDC for the search methods discussed in Section 5.3. 
We also seek to compare these methods with respect to risk in order to narrow the class 
of search methods which it is reasonable for a disclosure risk assessor to consider. This is 
desirable in practice since dependence of the risk upon the search method complicates the 
task of the assessor, given that the intruder will generally be hypothetical and hence the 
search method unknown. We shall argue in this section that it is reasonable for the 
assessor to restrict attention among the search methods to r1u and B1 and their extensions 
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to repeated records or known individuals. We consider two types of search methods in 
turn, under the headings discussed in the Section 5.3. 
5.4.1. Fishing methods 
We suppose first that the intruder begins by selecting a microdata record and then seeks a 
match in the population. The expressions for identification risk in Section 5.2. were 
derived for arbitrary records and hence will still apply provided the selection does not 
depend on some event which is informative about 
r
F  and any information provided by 
other records is ignored. Consider, following an example of Paass (1988), the case of an 
expenditure survey where there is a separate code in the microdata for individuals who 
purchase two or more boats. In one form of attack, an intruder might decide in advance to 
select any individual who falls into this category for a matching attempt on grounds of 
prior judgement that this is an unusual category. In this case, this selection is not 
dependent on any observed event and the expressions for identification risk in Section 
5.2. will continue to apply, under the assumptions made there provided we ignore 
observed data from other records. (This argument might be formalised under a given 
superpopulation model using the irrelevance of stopping rules, following Berger and 
Wolpert, 1984, p.74).  
In a second form of attack, the intruder might seek an unusual category on the basis 
of observing the microdata, for example it might be observed that there is only one 
individual in the microdata who purchases two or more boats. Here, conditioning the risk 
on the search method (see (1)) corresponds to conditioning on this observed sample 
uniqueness. These two forms of attack correspond to the distinction between methods r1, 
r2,…  of Section 5.2. and methods r1u, r2u,… of Section 5.3. 
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It follows from our definition in (1), however, that even in the case of method r1 
we should condition the risk on microdataX , i.e. the information provided by other microdata 
records and, in particular, sample uniqueness if it occurs. Thus the risk for an individual 
in the microdata who was selected by method r1 and subsequently found to be sample 
unique should be the same as if the same individual was selected by the intruder using 
method rlu after observing sample uniqueness. The risk for method r1 will tend to be 
higher if it is observed that the individual is not sample unique and hence, if concern is 
with the worst cases, we may argue that it is sufficient to restrict attention to r1u. 
In fact, if the sampling fraction is small, as is common in many SDC applications,  
sample uniqueness will not carry much information about 
r
F  under the Binomial model 
where p is given, since 
r
F  will be primarily determined by the behaviour of non-sample 
individuals. See section 6 for more detailed discussion of this point. We may therefore 
expect the risk for methods r1u, r2u,…  to be very similar to that for methods r1, r2,…  in 
these circumstances. For simplicity, we shall now compare risk for the latter methods and 
then infer that similar comparative properties will apply to the former methods. We 
suppose that the event of sample uniqueness represents the worst case, in terms of what 
microdata information the intruder might use to select a record for matching, and thus 
suppose that it is unnecessary to consider conditioning (1) on other features of microdataX . 
Suppose then that one of the methods r1, r2, … , r5 is employed and that the 
selection of the record is not informative so that the expressions for identification risk in 
Section 5.2. still apply. Note that these results also depend upon assumptions about the 
sampling scheme, discussed in Section 5.1. We now consider each of methods r2, … , r5 
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in turn, comparing them with method r1, and argue that it is reasonable to restrict 
attention amongst the search methods r1 to r5 just to method r1. 
Consider first search method r2. We have already suggested in Section 5.2. that this 
method is less plausible than the other methods. Moreover, search method r1 will, in 
general, lead to higher risk than method r2 since the size biasing in the latter method 
makes larger values of 
r
F more likely and these are associated with lower risk. Balding 
and Donnelly (1995) give an example where N=101, p=0.004 and the expressions in (5) 
and (7) are 0.826 and 0.714 respectively. Thus, disregarding method r2 but considering 
method r1 will be a conservative approach to risk assessment. 
Methods r3 and r4 may lead to slightly higher risk than method r2, but the risk will 
only be higher than method r1 if a substantial proportion of the population is searched. 
For example, if N=101 and p=0.004 then1/{1 ( 1 ) } 0.826N y p+ − − >   requires 48y ≥ , i.e. 
almost half the population must be searched. Indeed, using the approximation that N is 
large, p is small and 1Np <<  considered in Balding and Donnelly, it will in general be 
necessary for at least half the population to be searched (i.e. / 0.5y N > ) for methods r3 
or r4 to lead to a higher risk than method r1. Principles governing SDC often enable such 
‘disproportionate’  amounts of intruder information to be ruled out. For example the 
National Statistics Code of Practice (National Statistics, 2004, pp.7, 8) states, in relation 
to the use of SDC methods, that assumptions about the “information likely to be available 
to third parties” should be made “against the following standard: it would take a 
disproportionate amount of time, effort and expertise for an intruder to identify a 
statistical unit to others, or to reveal information about that unit not already in the public 
domain”. 
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Method r5 may also be disregarded on the grounds that the only relevant cases 
under this method reduce to those under methods r3 and r4 since it seems reasonable to 
discount the possibility of the intruder reporting that they have found a second match, 
because this would be expected to substantially reduce the risk by ruling out the 
possibility of population uniqueness. The resulting risk would be at most 0.5. For 
example, for the case N=101, p=0.004, expression (4.8) in Dawid (1994) implies the risk 
is 0.467. 
Finally, let us turn to methods r1u-r5u. As discussed earlier, we may expect the risk 
for these methods to be similar to that for methods r1-r5 for a given selected individual 
and thus we suggest the above argument for restricting attention to r1 may be extended to 
justify restricting attention to r1u out of the former methods. As noted earlier, it is 
appropriate to condition the risk for r1 on the observed occurrence or otherwise of sample 
uniqueness and, taking the worst case, since the risk of r1 given sample uniqueness is the 
same as the risk for r1u, we argue it is sufficient to restrict attention to the latter method.  
5.4.2. Directed Searches 
Turning to method B1, we note first that it is isomorphic to method r4 if we interchange 
the role of the microdata and the database.  Under this isomorphism, the indicator 
variables
riZ are translated into variables BiZ  for individuals i U∈ , indicating whether iX  
matches BX . For individuals i outside the microdata sample, iX  is defined to contain the 
values of the key variables which would be recorded in the microdata if i were selected 
into the sample. It is assumed that 1BBZ = . The corresponding Binomial model is that the 
BiZ are independent and identically distributed Bernoulli trials with p  denoting the 
probability of a match.  
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It then follows, as above, that under this new Binomial model, the identification 
risk is given by  
   identification risk = 1/{1 ( ) }N n p+ −  ,            (9) 
where n is size of the microdata sample.  
We expect that, for the same individual, p  and p will be of similar magnitude in 
many practical applications. As discussed in the previous section, expression (9) 
(with p p= ) will only be greater than the risk for method r1 if the sampling fraction, 
/n N , is high, roughly greater than 0.5. Since we expect the risks for r1u and r1 to be 
similar, we expect that in cases with small sampling fractions, it will usually be 
reasonable for the disclosure risk assessor to disregard B1 in favour of r1u. 
 
6. An Application with Categorical Key Variables and No Misclassification 
We now illustrate the assessment of risk in one kind of SDC application which arises 
with sample microdata from population censuses or social surveys. It is assumed that the 
key variables are categorical and identically measured in the two sources, with linkage 
based upon exact matching, i.e. example (i) of section 4. In this case, we label the 
combinations of categories of the key variables by x  so that the earlier expression X  for 
the key variables may now take the integer values 1,...,x K= . These combinations may 
be interpreted as cells in a multi-way contingency table. The Binomial model considered 
earlier implies a multinomial model for this contingency table. Since we assume that X  
is identical to X and that linkage is based upon exact matching, the Binomial model in 
section 5.1 for a given record with X x=  implies that the events iX x=  for different 
population units i U∈  are independent and identically distributed with Pr( )i xX x p= = , 
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where the subscript x  is added to the probability p  to indicate that this model relates to 
the event iX x= . Assuming that the Binomial model holds for all records with all 
possible values 1,...,x K= , it follows that the iX  are independent and identically 
distributed random variables with Pr( )i xX x p= = , 1,...,x K= , 1xp =∑ . 1,...,x K= . 
(Since X X=  and hence p p= , this model is also a consequence of the Binomial model 
in section 5.4.2.) The population counts xF  in the cells x thus follow a multinomial 
distribution with parameters xp  and N, 1,...,x K= . A related model, more common in the 
SDC literature, is the Poisson model where the xF are independently distributed as 
( )x xF Poisson λ . The multinomial model can, in fact, be derived from the Poisson 
model by conditioning on xN F= ∑ and setting /x x xp λ λ= ∑ (McCullagh and Nelder, 
1989, p.165). Even unconditionally, it may be argued that the two models have very 
similar SDC consequences when the xp  are small and N is large (Chen and Keller-
McNulty, 1998).  
In practice, the xp  are unknown, but inference about them may be made using the 
multiple records of the microdata. As discussed in section 5.1., we may suppose that an 
intruder could not know the values of the xF  but he/she may be expected to be able to 
compute the corresponding sample counts xf  from the multiple microdata records. In 
typical SDC applications, interest will focus on the ‘riskiest’  cells where xf  is small, say 
one or two (the values of xp  for empty cells with 0xf =  will not be of interest since 
these cells contain no microdata records susceptible to identification). The data within a 
cell x with such a small value of xf  will, however, carry little information, on its own, 
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about xp . For the model to be useful for risk assessment, it is therefore natural to consider 
‘borrowing information’  between cells by modelling the relation between the xp  in 
different cells.  One approach is to consider a compound model, such as a Poisson-
gamma model (Bethlehem et al., 1990) where the xλ , 1,...,x K= , are independent and 
identically gamma distributed or a Dirichlet-multinomial model where the  xp  follow a 
Dirichlet distribution. Such models imply that the identification risk is the same for each 
microdata record, since they treat all cells as exchangeable and make no use of the key 
variable characteristics used to construct the cells. Such characteristics may be 
conditioned upon in a log-linear model, relating xp  or xλ  to main effects and interactions 
between the key variables (Skinner and Holmes, 1998; Elamir and Skinner, 2006), in 
order to obtain more ‘realistic’  probabilities of identification, which may vary across 
cells. We now illustrate this with a numerical example, drawing on Skinner and Shlomo 
(2005). 
The data come from the 2001 United Kingdom Census for two large areas with a 
combined size of 950,000N ≈  individuals. A simple random sample of size 
0.005 4,750n N≈ ≈  is drawn from this ‘population’  to mimic a sample survey. The 
advantage of using census data is that the population characteristics can be used to 
validate sample-based procedures.  
The following six key variables (with numbers of categories in parentheses) are 
used: area (2), sex (2), age band (18), marital status (6), ethnicity (17) and economic 
activity (10).  The categories are the same as those used for the Samples of Anonymised 
Records from the census. See Dale and Elliot (2001) for a discussion of the choice of key 
variables in similar settings. The number of key variable combinations is thus K = 73,440 
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= 2×2×18×6×17×10. We assume the multinomial model above, that is that the population 
counts xF  in the cells of the six-way contingency table formed by cross-classifying the 
key variables are generated by a multinomial distribution with parameters N and xp , 
1,...,x K= .  As above, we suppose the  xF  are unknown but the corresponding sample 
counts xf  are known  ( xF N=∑ , xf n=∑ )  and may be used to make inference about 
the parameters xp . We suppose that such inference is conducted using a log-linear model 
for xp  including all main effects and two-way interactions (e.g. Agresti, 2002). Using the 
population data for validation, this model has been found to generate ‘reasonable’  
disclosure risk assessments both for these data (Skinner and Shlomo, 2005) and similar 
data sources (Skinner and Holmes, 1998; Elamir and Skinner, 2006). Let ˆ xp  denote the 
maximum likelihood estimate of xp  under this multinomial log-linear model. In Table 3 
we present values of  ˆ xp  for three individuals selected from the sample. We consider 
only the 739 sample unique cells, i.e. cells where 1xf = , to continue our ‘worst case’  
analysis, and select those sample unique individuals with the minimum, median and 
maximum values of ˆ xp  across these 739 cells. A comparison of the second and third 
columns in the table shows how the values ˆ xp  could help the intruder infer which of the 
sample uniques are likely to have smaller (or larger) values of xF . For example, 
individuals in ethnic minority groups tend to fall into cells with smaller values of xF  and 
this is picked up by the model through the main effect term for the ethnic group. Unusual 
combinations of pairs of key variables, e.g. widowed 20-24 year-olds, are picked up 
through the two-way interaction terms in the model. Impossible two-way combinations, 
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e.g. married 0-4 year olds, can also be handled in the model and will, of course, not 
appear in the sample.  
Table 3 also includes estimates of identification risk for these three individuals 
under different assumptions about the intruder’ s search method. Considering first search 
method r1 and replacing p by ˆ xp  in expression (5) gives risk estimates of 0.9298, 0.0149 
and 0.009 for the sample unique individuals with minimum, median and maximum values 
of ˆ xp  respectively. We might conclude that the release of the sample microdata are not 
‘likely to identify’  the second and third individuals, in the language of the Code of 
Practice. However, the risk for the first individual appears high. In fact, the first 
individual is not population unique. There are, in fact, five women in the second area in 
the population who are recorded as being aged 20-24, of separated marital status, in the 
Bangladeshi ethnic group and with ‘looking after home’  as their economic activity. Out 
of the ten sample unique individuals with the lowest values of ˆ xp  just three turn out to be 
population unique so the risk estimate of 0.9298 might be judged somewhat high. This 
raises questions about the choice of the log-linear model and the estimation method 
which we shall not pursue here. Our focus is on the comparison of risk estimates for 
different search methods treating these values of ˆ xp  as realistic and given. 
The above risk estimates for method r1 only use the microdata to estimate xp  and 
ignore the information that the individuals are sample unique. As discussed in Section 
5.4.1., conditioning on sample uniqueness is equivalent to considering method r1u. The 
microdata sample is obtained by simple random sampling of size n (without replacement) 
so, under the multinomial model, the conditional distribution of xF  given 1xf =  may be 
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obtained using the fact that the frequencies, xf  and  x xF f−  are independently 
Binomially distributed: ( , )xf Bin n p  and ( , )x xF f Bin N n p− − . Hence the risk is 
given by  
 
1(1/ | 1) (1/[1 ( )]) [1 (1 ) ] /[( 1) ]N n
r r r r
E F f E F f p N n p− += = + − = − − − + ,              (10) 
i.e. as in expression (5) but with N  replaced by 1N n− + . Table 3 shows that the impact 
of this change is minor in all three cases. Inspection of expressions (5) and (10) indicates 
that this will generally be the case if the sampling fraction n/N is small. 
We next consider search method r2. As expected from the discussion in section 
5.4.1, Table 3 displays lower risk estimates for this method than method r1, although the 
reduction is not great. The risk for methods r3 and r4 is given by expression (8). This 
expression depends on the number y+1 of individuals in the database used for matching 
(in method r4). We now calculate how large y+1 must be for the risk of methods r3 or r4 
to exceed the risk of method r1u. Equating (8) and (10) and solving for y+1, we find that 
it is necessary to search databases of sizes at least 463,000, 17,300 or 5,550 for the 
minimum, median and maximum cases respectively. Most importantly, we find that for 
the most risky case we must search a database of almost half the size of the population 
for method r4 to lead to a higher risk than method r1u. This accords with the discussion 
in section 5.4.1.    
Finally, we consider method B1. Expression (9) is the same as expression (8) for 
method r4 when p p= (which we are assuming in this section) and when the size y+1 of 
the database is the same as the sample size n . We have 4750n ≈  and since this is 
smaller than the three database sizes above, method B1 always leads to a lower risk than 
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method r1u. In fact, it gives very similar results to method r2 since the sampling fraction 
is small.  
In summary, we conclude from the numerical comparison in Table 3 that it is 
sufficient to consider only method r1u as a worse case, but that the values of the risk for 
all the methods are of a similar magnitude so that the ‘worst case’  approach would not be 
overly conservative if an intruder employed one of the other methods. Following the 
discussion in section 5, we may expect to be able to generalise the finding that method 
r1u is the worst case to any situation where the sampling fraction is small, X X=   and 
any errors in the estimation of xp can be ignored. 
 
7. Discussion 
A key objective of SDC for microdata release is to limit the ability of an intruder to 
achieve identification. This requires limiting the identification risk for any record which 
might be selected for linkage. A main theme of this paper has been to consider, following 
discussion in the forensic identification literature, how this identification risk may depend 
upon the search method used by the intruder to select the record for linkage. We have 
discussed how this dependence might occur and have suggested that, in practice, it may 
be handled by considering worst cases amongst a number of plausible alternative search 
methods. Our discussion suggests a focus on the method denoted r1u earlier, a focus 
which is consistent with the modelling foundations of approaches in Skinner and Holmes 
(1998) and Elamir and Skinner (2006) for categorical key variables. This paper therefore 
provides some justification for the assumptions in these two papers. Another possible 
analogous application of the ideas in this paper would be to the assessment of the threat 
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to disclosure posed by record linkage methods based upon a mixture of categorical and 
continuous key variable. 
In this paper we have defined identification risk at the record level. In practice, it 
will often be necessary in SDC work to make judgements about risk at the file level. This 
may be achieved by aggregating record level measures, as discussed by Lambert (1993), 
or by defining a file-level measure directly. For example, Skinner and Elliot (2002) 
consider two measures which may be represented as two alternative averages of values of 
1/
r
F (c.f. equation (4)). The two measures correspond to alternative possible search 
methods: one to the intruder drawing a sample unique record in the microdata at random 
(with equal probabilities); the other to the intruder selecting at random any population 
unit which match a sample unique record. The two measures can, however, take very 
different values, illustrating how such file level measures can be very sensitive to 
assumptions about the intruder’ s search method. Indeed, we suggest this sensitivity is 
rather greater than the dependence of record level measures upon the search method, as 
discussed in this paper.  
There are a number of other pros and cons of file-level vs. record level measures. 
File-level measures, such as the population-averaged measure in Skinner and Elliot 
(2002), not only have the advantage that they are simple but they can also be estimated 
robustly, whereas inference about record-level measures may be expected to be more 
model-sensitive (given the relative amount of ‘information’  available at each level). On 
the other hand, the aims of SDC are often expressed in a way that seems to correspond 
better to a definition at the record level. For example, the requirement in the National 
Statistics Code of Practice (National Statistics, 2004, p.11) that “ the guarantee of 
 34 
confidentiality must be applied equally to all statistical units”  suggests reference to a unit 
level concept of disclosure risk. Model sensitivity can be handled in the framework of a 
sensitivity analysis, which seems a necessary feature of disclosure risk assessment in any 
case if alternative sets of assumptions about the possible auxiliary key information 
available to an intruder are to be considered, as well as alternative assumptions about 
possible measurement error. The sensitivity analysis could also be used to handle the 
selection of alternative types of records. If it is desired to aggregate record level measures 
across records and if large values of the measure are of most concern then a suitable 
approach might be count the number of records for which the identification risk is above 
a given threshold (Lambert, 1993, p.317). Combining record-level measures by counting 
or averaging seems likely to be more robust to model specification than taking the 
maximum value.     
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Table 1. Correspondence between Two Prototypical Problems 
 
Notation Forensic Identification Statistical Disclosure Control 
 
Crime Responding to a survey 
A Culprit, committing crime Respondent 
U ( A U∈ ) Population of possible culprits Population, from which respondent 
drawn  
 Prosecuting authority bringing 
suspect to trial 
Intruder 
B ( U∈ ) Suspect selected by prosecuting 
authority 
Known individual linked by intruder 
to microdata record 
r 
 
Label for evidence at scene of 
crime 
Label for microdata record derived 
from respondent’ s data 
A(r) Culprit producing evidence r Respondent providing data in record r 
( )A rX  Traces of culprit at crime scene Key variable values on record r 
BX  Characteristics of suspect 
corresponding to variables in X  
Key variable values observed on 
individual B 
 Search method  
(selection of B) 
Search method (Scenario of attack) 




Table 2. Alternative Intruder Search Methods 
 
Notation Starts with 
selection of: 
Proceeds by: 
    Fishing Methods 
r1 Arbitrary 
record, r 
searching population randomly until match is found 
r2 Arbitrary 
record, r 
drawing individual at random from the population and 
observing match by chance 
r3 Arbitrary 
record, r 
 as method r1 but recording length of search 
r4 Arbitrary 
record, r 









record, r  
as for method r1, r2, r3…  respectively 




searching microdata records and finding unique match 
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Table 3. Estimated Identification Risk for Sample Unique Cases with Minimum, 
Median and Maximum Values of Estimated Cell Probabilities. 
 





















































































time employed  
 
0.00121 
 
maximum 
 
870 
 
0.0009 
 
0.0009 
 
0.0009 
 
0.0009 
 
